Barriers, emotions, and motivational levers for lifestyle transformation in Norwegian household decarbonization pathways by Moberg, Karen Richardsen et al.
Barriers, emotions, and motivational levers for lifestyle
transformation in Norwegian household
decarbonization pathways
Karen Richardsen Moberg1 & Benjamin K. Sovacool2,3 & Alexandra Goritz4,5 &
Gaëtan M. Hinojosa6 & Carlo Aall1 & Maria Nilsson7
Received: 9 June 2020 /Accepted: 2 February 2021 /Published online: 1 March 2021
# The Author(s) 2021
Abstract
Meeting the Paris Agreement targets requires strong near-term climate change mitigation
in all sectors of the economy. Increasing demand-side emission abatement efforts is one
important area to pursue, yet there are significant barriers that must be overcome in order
to realize its potential. We ask: What barriers may be hindering deep emissions reduction
at the household level? What kinds of levers are available to achieve emission reductions?
Based on an original and extensive qualitative dataset, our in-depth study of households
in Bergen, Norway, shows that individuals perceive they are confronted with consider-
able individual, economic, and infrastructural barriers that prevent them from taking deep
mitigation actions. Our results however also suggest that some barriers can be overcome
with motivational levers such as the availability of more sustainable alternatives, support
networks and by the positive emotions felt when having a positive impact on the
environment. Other barriers are more difficult to overcome, pointing to the overarching
lesson from our study that households will need to be forced or incentivized beyond
voluntary efforts to achieve rapid and comprehensive decarbonization. The current policy
approach, aimed mostly at nudging for voluntary mitigation actions, is wholly inadequate
to achieve significant emission reductions. Our study indicates that households are open
for increasingly including more “sticks” into climate policymaking. While there are
significant challenges to individuals taking stronger mitigation action, these can be
overcome by strengthening government policies targeting the patterns and, importantly,
volumes of household consumption.
Keywords Climate changemitigation .Household carbon footprints .Climate policy .Demand-
sidemitigation
Climatic Change (2021) 165: 3
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-021-03018-y
* Benjamin K. Sovacool
B.Sovacool@sussex.ac.uk
Extended author information available on the last page of the article
1 Introduction
Reaching the Paris Agreement goal to limit global average temperature increase to well below
2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursue efforts to limit temperature increase to 1.5 °C
(UNFCCC 2015: 2–3), requires stringent emission reductions in all societal sectors. Neither
current climate change mitigation policies nor the Nationally Determined Contributions
(NDCs) under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
are consistent with the goals set in the Paris Agreement (UNEP 2019; Höhne et al. 2020).
Greenhouse gas (GHG) emission pathways consistent with a 2 °C world have already included
most supply-side mitigation potential by 2050, meaning further mitigation beyond the 2 °C
goal requires removal of GHGs from the atmosphere and scale-up of efforts in demand-side
mitigation (Millar et al. 2017; Rogelj et al. 2015; Sanderson et al. 2016). A scale-up of
demand-side mitigation would entail targeting GHG emissions from private consumption to a
greater extent than what has up until now been the case due to perceptions of political
infeasibility (Dubois et al. 2019). However, targeting household consumption to a greater
extent might be more politically feasible than often assumed by policymakers and researchers
(Moberg et al. 2019; Stern and Dietz 2020; Gilligan and Vandenbergh 2020).
Households can displace large amounts of GHGs through direct and indirect emissions
from their consumption activities, particularly in the areas of mobility, housing, diet, and waste
(Dietz et al. 2009; IPCC 2014: 66; Dietz 2014). As much as 72% of global GHG emissions can
be ascribed to household consumption, the remaining share being related to public consump-
tion (Hertwich and Peters 2009). Reducing emissions from household behavior therefore holds
vast GHG mitigation potential, a potential, current climate policies only address to a limited
extent (Moberg et al. 2019). If we accept that stringent demand-side emission reductions are an
essential component of a move to a low-carbon/post-carbon society that achieves the Paris
Agreement goals, then climate policies must to a greater extent aim towards reducing volumes
of mobility (such as air travel, car use) and residential energy consumption and changing
patterns of food consumption (such as eating less meat) (Moberg et al. 2019; Sköld et al. 2018;
Dubois et al. 2019; Herrmann et al. 2020).
However, such focused—and potentially effective—demand-side options remain woefully
unpopular in research and political communities. Addressing household GHG emissions has
often been explicitly excluded in government climate policymaking (Wynes and Nicholas
2017). That said, a demand-side policy mapping carried out in Norway, Sweden, France, and
Germany did reveal that many demand-side climate policies already exist, although they are
insufficient to trigger lifestyle changes that may be required for achieving the Paris Agreement
goals (Moberg et al. 2019). As one very recent study warned: “Much of the literature on
mitigation pathways addresses technological and economic aspects of feasibility, but over-
looks the behavioral, cultural, and social factors that affect theoretical and practical mitigation
pathways” (Nielsen et al. 2020: 325). Adding to the challenge, Dickinson et al. (2009) admit
that many high-impact actions available to households remain unpopular politically and
perhaps even socially. Connolly and Prothero (2003) add that some consumers can even come
to abdicate their responsibility for consumption and place it at the hands of energy or material
suppliers.
In order to address this pesky nexus of demand-side options, lifestyles, barriers, and
required behavioral change to decarbonize lifestyles, it is necessary to better diagnose which
behavioral determinants should be targeted by policy intervention (Abrahamse et al. 2005:
283) and how to balance use of “carrots” and “sticks” to achieve necessary consumption
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changes (Aall and Hille 2010; Herrmann et al. 2018; Moberg et al. 2019; Dubois et al. 2019;
Herrmann et al. 2020). We ask: What barriers may hinder deep emission reduction at the
household level? What kinds of levers are available to achieve emission reductions at the
household level? To answer these questions, this paper analyzes semi-structured in-depth
interviews with a selection of households in Bergen, Norway, that participated in the research
project Household Preferences for Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions in four European
High Income Countries (HOPE). Our results contribute to the understanding of household
perceptions on individual climate change mitigation action in a high-income and high-
consuming country context. Such knowledge may be important when forming policy recom-
mendations for the next round of NDCs on how countries plan to meet the Paris Agreement
goals.
2 Carbon, consumption, and the promise of household mitigation
A growing body of research suggests that household carbon reductions through behavioral schemes
could be substantial. An interdisciplinary study of 16 action types concluded that implementing the
most successful behavioral programs could reduce US household carbon emissions by 20% by
2020, an amount equal to all GHG emissions from France (Dietz et al. 2009). Similarly, one energy
efficiency program in Oregon cut average household carbon dioxide emissions by 22% in 1 month
primarily by publishing an “emissions calculator” that compared individuals’ carbon footprints to
that of their neighbors (Rabkin and Gershon 2007). A study of stationary energy-use in Norwegian
households stipulates that putting a cap on the size of new residential homes can save up to 30% in
energy-use for the next 30 years comparedwith a business-as-usual trend (Aall 2013).More recently
and looking at Europe, Moran et al. (2020) project that changes in consumer practices and
consumption patterns could reduce carbon footprints further beyond business as usual by roughly
25%. Levesque et al. (2019) even project that globally, adopting new, energy saving practices could
reduce energy demand from buildings by up to 47% in 2050 and 61% in 2100 compared to a
scenario following current trends.
However, another study considering high-income countries found that consumer-oriented
mitigation policies tend to focus on low-impact actions, leaving a significant mitigation gap
compared to what could be realized in demand-side mitigation (Wynes and Nicholas 2017: 7).
If we are to realize the mitigation potential in the demand-side of the economy, we need to
further explore how to overcome these barriers to accelerate household climate mitigation
(Lorenzoni and Pidgeon 2006: 73), and catalyze insights from behavioral science and psy-
chology about how to motivate households to change their practices and lifestyles (Allen et al.
2015; Bouman and Steg 2019; Schmitt et al. 2018; Attari et al. 2009). Moreover, initiatives
directed towards individual behavior can easily fall prey to over-optimism and proposals that
ignore barriers to adoption (Dubois et al. 2019). They may lastly misunderstand how house-
holds actually use energy or other services in the home, relying on “folk” knowledge,
underestimating impacts of their own behavior, and improperly calculating their own energy
consumption footprints (Kempton and Montgomery 1982).
More rigor can be brought to these efforts by examining the technical potential of targeting
behavior (the emissions reductions potential if all possible behavior change occurs) and
behavioral plasticity (the extent to which state-of-the-art programs can change behavior)
(Dietz et al. 2009; Gilligan and Vandenbergh 2020). Promising aspects of this work include
exploring and emphasizing different types of consumers, such as those who are boundedly
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rational, predictably irrational, locked-in, or socially constrained (Shwom and Lorenzen 2012);
the important role of values and norms which can act as intrinsic motivators for climate action
(Steg 2016); and the possibility of social influence and spillovers in sustainable behavior (Van
Der Werff and Steg 2018). Research also has noted the importance of accounting for policy
plasticity (the extent to which organizations can adopt and implement behavioral programs) in
analysis of climate mitigation initiatives. Interdisciplinary research is needed to refine and
apply analytical frameworks for initiatives targeting individual behavior and translate the
research into specific policy recommendations. Niamir et al. (2020: 1) concur in their recent
assessment of the literature that “while households as agents of change increasingly become a
crucial element in energy transitions, bottom-up mechanisms facilitating behavioral change are
not fully understood.”Wood et al. (2020: 2) add that research on carbon footprints needs to be
better grounded in understanding the drivers of domestic consumption as well as “on account-
ing and responsibility for enacting change.”
3 Research design: reflective household in-depth interviews in Norway
With these gaps in mind, we designed a study to examine the underlying drivers behind carbon
footprints, barriers to more climate friendly lifestyles, and potential levers for reducing
emissions in four mid-sized cities in Europe. Due to the trend of increasing urbanization,
estimating that almost 70% of the world’s population will live in cities by 2050 (UNDESA
2019), our study had an urban focus. We developed a mixed-methods study design involving
three sequential interactions with households in Bergen (Norway), Umeå (Sweden), Mann-
heim (Germany), and Aix-en-Provence (France) as part of the HOPE research project. Original
results of the third interaction with Norwegian households have yet to be published, and are
presented in this paper. Norway is particularly important to examine given that policymakers
have made very clear their official reservations as to not develop a consumer-oriented climate
mitigation policy—a position that was clearly stated in the first Norwegian government green
paper on how to reduce emissions by two thirds by 2050 (NOU 2006). A brief account of the
HOPE household interactions is provided below.
Interaction 1 was a quantitative questionnaire to collect basic socio-economic, demograph-
ic, and consumption data to calculate household carbon footprints. Interaction 2 was a
simulation game where participants were asked to reduce their carbon footprint by 50% by
2030. This goal represents the need for stringent, near-term mitigation measures (IPCC 2014).
It also reflects the idea that high-income countries with corresponding high levels of historical
consumption-related GHG emissions should accept a higher reduction burden than the average
global burden. That said, questions of burden sharing among countries and sectors as well as
how to divide policy-focus between production- and consumption-related sources of GHG
emissions are up for debate (Page 2011). During the simulation game, households could
choose from 65 mitigation actions in the sectors “food,” “housing,” “mobility,” and “other
consumption.” These were presented as action cards, containing information about CO2e
reduction, economic costs/savings, and possible health co-benefits. In the first round, partic-
ipants were invited to choose “voluntary” measures. If participants failed to reach the 50%
reduction goal in the first round, a second round was introduced where they had to select
additional measures, imagining being forced by their government, until they reached the goal
of 50% emission reduction. A total of 308 European households participated in Interactions 1
and 2. Interaction 3 involved semi-structured in-depth interviews with a sub-sample of
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households that participated in Interactions 1 and 2. The purpose was to gather their thoughts
and reflections on mitigation choices, and possibilities of implementing these measures in real
life. This paper focuses on Interaction 3 with households of the Norwegian case (see Herrmann
et al. 2018 for a detailed description of the research design of all three interactions, and Sköld
et al. 2018 for the main results from the first two interactions).
We applied a purposive sampling with maximum variation ensuring that participating
households differed meaningfully in terms of the gender, age, education, income, and nation-
ality of their occupants, in addition to housing status (renter, owner), housing type (apartment,
single house), household location (urban, suburban, rural), household size, and the presence of
children (< 18 years) in the household (see Table A1 in Appendix). We made sure to cover
extremes in terms of including households with high and low carbon footprints, and at least
one “climate sceptic,” one “climate expert,” one that refused to reduce their footprint by half,
and one that quickly reached the reduction goal. The principle of data saturation was applied to
determine the sample size of Interaction 3 (Hennink et al. 2019). Saturation was reached by the
16th interview, since few new elements had emerged during the four preceding interviews.
Each household was given a unique identifier which we refer to later in the study whenever
presenting direct quotations.
We followed a reflective interview guide developed by our interdisciplinary team with
expertise spanning medical and life sciences, behavioral science and psychology, political
science, geography, media studies, and engineering. The guide consisted of five main sections
and a series of open-ended and probing questions as well as short narratives and scenarios to
react on (see A2 in appendix for an English short version of the interview guide). The in-depth
interviews of Interaction 3 lasted between 54 and 104 min and were carried out via Skype and
FaceTime by the first author in 2017. The interviews were transcribed verbatim and underwent
two analytical approaches. First, a conventional content analysis was undertaken, supported by
the software NVivo to systematically interpret the meaning of the data (Hsieh and Shannon
2005). In the analysis results were delineated by developing codes derived directly from the
data, and grouped into content categories, systematically moving from what was literally in the
text towards the latent content of that text, the latter involving a higher degree of interpretation
than the former (Berg 2007).
The initial coding of data was carried out by the first author. The last author read the
interviews and coded two interviews for the purpose of analyst triangulation, discussing and
agreeing with the first author on codes. The second author grouped codes with a similar content
into categories fromwhich one central theme emerged that brought the categories together. The
results were iteratively revisited and discussed between this paper’s co-authors. Second, the first
author carried out a directed analysis of the data based on the Sköld et al. (2018) results on
which consumption areas are most critical for halving household GHG emissions. The barriers
to and motivations for adopting changes mentioned in relation to the three consumption areas
holding the biggest mitigation potential (mobility, food, housing) were noted, as well as specific
reflections on policy changes that may support lifestyle changes in those areas.
4 Results
The first part of this section (4.1) presents the results from the conventional content analysis. It
will focus first on the carbon-intensive nature of existing lifestyles, and the barriers to climate
action and motivational levers for transformational change. The second part (4.2) presents the
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results from the directed analysis, focusing on specific policy reflections of our informants
across consumption areas with high mitigation potential.
4.1 Stronger incentives and policies are required to support lifestyle decarbonization
Based on the codes and the four categories, one core theme emerged in the analytical process:
“Stronger incentives and policies are required to support household lifestyle decarbonisation.”
The four categories leading up to the theme contain concepts of perceived barriers and levers:
& Decarbonizing lifestyles is difficult and inconvenient;
& Climate change and decarbonization is intimate and emotional;
& Knowledge by itself is insufficient to catalyze change;
& Transformational levers do exist to overcome barriers and impediments.
These results are illustrated at a high level in Fig. 1 and elaborated in the subsections to come,
organized according to analytical categories that also title each sub-section.
4.1.1 Decarbonizing lifestyles is difficult and inconvenient
In our interviews, although on a general level we frequently found positive associations
connected to the prospect of a low carbon future, our interviewees strongly pointed to multiple
barriers for consumption change, an overall barrier being our current lifestyle:
Globally, [a low carbon future] could have a positive impact in the long term. It’s an
ideal world, but I am not the one who thinks we can do [it]. I'm not that optimistic.
Fig. 1 Characterization of the barriers and motivations for lifestyle decarbonization in Norway. Core research
finding (inner circle) and thematic categories (outer circle)
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[Consumption prevents this]. That such a big part of the world is rich, and that we have
actually invented cars and planes, and these cannot become truly environmentally
friendly in the foreseeable future.
(Informant 0032).
Many interviewees reported lacking the capacity to implement changes due to time use of the
changed behavior and difficulty with changing existing habits since forming new habits was
perceived as hard work. Cost was one of the most frequently mentioned barriers to change in
different areas of consumption: the high perceived cost of climate beneficial actions prevented
change, and the comparative low cost of carbon-intensive actions. There was a sense in the
interviews that while “we are all responsible” for acting on climate change, it is the govern-
ment that must take the lead since we cannot count on individual action. Many also found it
tough to be confronted by one’s own unwillingness to change. Household reflections about
food, housing, and mobility are most apt at illustrating these issues.
On the topic of food, statements would repeatedly reveal that it was difficult to imagine a
diet involving less animal protein. Many interviewees felt it was not possible to be fully
vegetarian, and that eating meat was natural or necessary to feel full:
I believe that meat is an important part of a diet and I have a cohabitant who shares that
opinion.
(Informant 0023).
When asked “what do you think about becoming a vegetarian,” many could not conceive of
becoming a vegetarian or switching diets:
It’s interesting, but out of the question. It’s a very distant thought in my world, I was
raised with eating our animals, sheep and sometimes rabbits and chickens. So it's a very
distant thought.
(Informant 0032).
Difference of opinion internally in the household on what constitutes a proper diet was also a
barrier to eating more vegetarian food:
Personally, I can eat vegetarian food occasionally for dinner and such. But […] I won’t
get the whole family in on it […] Not that long ago, [my daughter] made such a
vegetarian dish. And it was very good, but the boys did not see this as a dinner. There
was no food in it. They felt hungry again. So I think there is a bit of ingrained skepticism
that vegetarian food alone is not a proper dinner.
(Informant 0036).
Others had “no plans” to voluntarily adopt a low-carbon diet for climate reasons: any such
change would be purely health motivated:
I don’t have any plans to become a vegetarian or changing my diet. I see the
youth, they are totally crazy. I see with my boy, with friends that are vegans
and vegetarians […]. The thought is probably good. But I have asked them,
they must have proteins [laughs] and yes, they eat beans [laughs]. It’s possible
of course, but I’m not a big fan of it even though I don’t eat a lot of meat
myself […]. Today we mainly sit around on our asses, and we don’t really need
all that energy like they did in the past […] so it’s for those reasons, and I
don’t think of CO2 emissions when I eat a lot of fruit and vegetables. So it’s
Climatic Change (2021) 165: 3 Page 7 of 25 3
really only wellness and health that is my motivation for not eating meat.
(Informant 0026).
Even if meat was much more expensive, due to some sort of tax or climate legislation, some
said they would still buy it because it is what they are used to:
I think I’d still buy meat. Of course, I wouldn’t buy a beef tenderloin as often, it’s
expensive enough already, but I probably wouldn’t, perhaps I would think about it in the
beginning, and then it would become normal like now. It is already twice as expensive in
Norway to buy a tenderloin compared to Spain, for example, you live with it. You move
on and you buy what you want.
(Informant 0037).
Interviewees revealed similar barriers to change with lower carbon forms of housing. Barriers
included unwillingness to move from rural areas to urban ones, or to smaller homes that may
have lower carbon footprints, or to build a new and more sustainable home. This was coupled
with views of purchasing passive homes, and the required investments for energy efficiency
upgrades in their existing residence were too expensive. When asked for thoughts about
moving to a more central location (and as a result reduce transport-related emissions), one
informant responded:
Absolutely out of the question. […]. We live twenty kilometers from Bergen city center.
Rural, [we] run a farm. It seems possible that sometime in the future [we] may move a
bit more central, but I can’t imagine it. It's not a wish me and my husband have. […] it
would probably be more environmentally friendly, but at the same time I think that
living in a city isn’t good for my health or the health of my children. And that’s a choice
we make.
(Informant 0032).
Strong preference for living in their present home because it posited other qualities of more
importance to them was another barrier for moving to a more climate friendly home:
We had a discussion before last time we moved about where we wanted to live. Now we
live in a place where we own our own kindergarten, and we have zero transport. We live
in, it’s like a small village in the city. We have many social activities and know our
neighbors well. Lots of families with children. The outdoor area is car free. Big area for
kids to play […]. We like our housing cooperative so much that we don't want to move.
(Informant 0025).
The issue of costs of energy efficient homes was noted by several informants: “it sounds very
nice you could say that I could save so and so much energy. But cost is an important barrier.”
(Informant 0028). Investment costs of more efficient sources of heating was an important
barrier to efficiency upgrades in existing homes:
Changing to a heat pump was something I imagined would be easy for me to do, but it’s
an investment so we haven’t done that yet. And I don’t know that we will do it either,
but it’s absolutely possible.
(Informant 0023).
While economic support schemes for energy efficiency upgrades do exist and were acknowl-
edged by many informants, the subsidies were often seen as insufficient:
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If there had been beneficial support schemes for those things. The problem is that I do a
lot myself, and I’ve looked at those support schemes, such as support for removing oil
furnaces and such. To get the support you’d have to use a company which costs a pork
and a fortune, and if you can do it yourself, it costs something then as well, but you don’t
get any support then. So those support schemes are really just a joke. […] It’s cheaper to
do it yourself […] the same goes for energy efficiency upgrades and that whole package.
(Informant 0026).
Finally, climate-friendly actions related to mobility such as flying less and avoiding car
transport were perceived as difficult to adopt. Reasons included that it was easy and convenient
to fly, and that flying was too cheap. Many interviewees believed that the only way to reduce
air travel was to increase its cost or restrict the number of flights per person:
Generally I think it would help if it cost more. That it wasn’t so easy to travel abroad.
Also in a way for my own sake, when I think oh it would be fun and it only costs NOK
1000 for a round trip and such. But it’s a little difficult because it’s so alluring to travel
abroad and if you are travelling a great distance, then airplanes are absolutely un-
matched. […] But […] it would be nice if [people] limited themselves so everyone
[…] had the opportunity to take a holiday every other year or so to the great abroad […].
It’s very important to deal with this even though it might mean we only get that one
flight every other year, I know it’s a luxury, so I do it with some shame on the side.
(Informant 0022).
Many informants also pointed out that it was difficult to give up air travel with their current job
since it is a time-efficient travel mode:
There is often a reason to fly, I’m not only doing it for a holiday. It’s business trips and
such, […] some have to travel for work, and then you often choose to go by plane. You
do not drive to Oslo for example. You want to get from A to B in the fastest possible
way. No, it’s not easy to know what to do.
(Informant 0024).
For some, air travel was also necessary to visit family living far away:
I’m not from Norway so I fly home to North America once a year. And that isn’t
something I can stop doing. My mother lives there and I am an only child and she is not
married, so I don’t feel that I can stop visiting her. […] And then I fly a bit with my job.
You know the seven and a half hours it takes to go by train to Oslo makes it impossible
in a busy everyday life. It's sad.
(Informant 0027).
Only more expensive plane tickets or serious wars would prevent Informant 0026’s plane travels:
I doubt our lifestyle is changing that much when it comes to vacations and things like
that. […] As long as it’s this cheap to fly and as long as there is no serious war then we’ll
travel by plane. […] the only thing that stops me is if plane tickets become more
expensive.
Informant 0037 implied that they would rather give up their car than flying, it has become so
key to their life: “Now I would rather give up the car than airplanes. […] it's very difficult to
get to other countries without airplanes.”
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For many informants, however, the idea of giving up their personal car was unattractive
since the existing public transport solutions were no good substitute due to poor coverage for
solving daily logistics such as getting the kids to and from kindergarten, or enabling leisure
activities:
[…] then we’d have to also give up the one activity we all love the most which
is being on the mountain. Or at the cabin. We could reach local mountains, but
going by bus to anything farther than the three closest mountains in Bergen is
difficult. I’ve lived by one of the other mountains around Bergen, and there
were, on Sundays that is, there were maybe two busses. You can’t get there for
a hike with a family on a weekend. So [public transport] is not good for
enabling those leisure activities. And it would require incredible amounts of
travel time to get to the mountain [by public transport]. […] we’d be a bit stuck
in the city. And we don’t like that.
(Informant 0025).
It’s difficult where we live. We don’t have good bus connections and such. So with
kindergarten, we only had one car previously, and it was very hard to juggle pick-up and
delivery to kindergarten with work and all that. And no busses pass us, so yeah. It was
too difficult [with just one car].
(Informant 0030).
The option of replacing their fossil fuel car with an EV was also seen as unfeasible by some
until the technology has matured and better EV alternatives emerge:
[…] if there were good enough alternatives in EVs I’d consider it, but as things are today
it’s not an option. But if [government] says that they’re gonna [only sell new EVs] by
2025 then the technology has to be at a level where good enough alternatives are
available.
(Informant 0023).
One informant questioned whether cars and planes can be environmentally friendly,
and the lack of critical reflection on technological optimism related to mobility:
[…] we have green planes, environmentally friendly, right, it’s just a bad joke. You can't
sell a car or a flight and say it is good for the environment, that is, but I think many
people in this country believe it [laughs]. But fair enough. I don’t know, people probably
believe in Santa Claus too. So I doubt there are that many people who are very reflected
about [their choice of flying].
(Informant 0026)
Another more overarching barrier to take action was that climate goals are set so far into the
future. Informant 0031 said this works almost like a sleeping pillow that stops them from
taking needed action in the present:
I hear it myself, it's such a pessimistic way of thinking. But because it’s so
urgent now, and because everyone must join […] we should set goals that we
think we can join in on now. And maybe not so far into the future. Because
these deadlines that are set so many years into the future become like a resting
pillow. Like, don’t have to change now, not until this and that many years. So I
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don't think that's good enough, and then I get sad, I feel a little pessimistic. On
behalf of Norway and the world. That we can’t do this.
Most of our informants agreed that stronger government action is the only way to decarbonize
lifestyles. In the words of Informant 0027: “I think many people will make decisions based on
whether it’s an easy choice to make. Which is why I think governments should just come in
and put their foot down.”
4.1.2 Climate change and decarbonization is intimate and emotional
Our second result is that household decarbonization is not only an issue of costs and benefits
(cheap flights, affordable meat) or lifestyles (I need to fly for my job, or to see my family). It is
also a topic that involves stark and at times contradictory and overwhelming emotions, which
both shape rational responses and also lead to potential fear and anxiety. (Emotions can be a
positive force as well, but we will return to that in Section 4.1.4). Many households were
worried about the future some not only due to climate change itself but also due to the beliefs
and reactions of other people:
I think it’s pretty scary, and we all know that the climate is changing. But I also think it's
a little difficult to talk to people about this problem, because not everyone believe
climate change is because of CO2. Many think it’s a normal process, a natural process,
and that scares me more.
(Informant 0035).
Feeling hopeless about the situation was also prevalent, and for many this could be
discouraging:
[…] you have those that know about it, but that actually just choose to not care. And
then there isn’t that much we can do about it really. We can put a lot of pressure on them
[industry, businesses], but if they are sitting there when it comes down to it, and they are
aware already of these changes and everything, then there isn’t that much we can do
about it.
(Informant 0028).
The sense of hopelessness made it difficult for some to believe that making an effort matters:
[…] all childlike faith, hope for the future has really evaporated. You think you are screwed
anyway, so why bother […] I do not have that much hope for the future in relation to climate,
I don’t. So my kids will probably grow up in a different reality than myself then.
(Informant 0031).
Several informants worried about both the present and future generations:
I’m afraid the climate is a factor that can cause [human civilization] to go in the wrong
direction. As we see with drought, food problems in Sub-Saharan Africa can provide refugee
flows to Europe […] And I am afraid that our children will face even more difficult situations
and will be forced to make even tougher choices about how to prioritize.
(Informant 0025).
Emotions—especially those of pessimism— can impact both footprints and possible respon-
sive pathways. Informants discussed varying degrees of ambivalence and apathy—also types
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of emotions—to the problem. Informant 0022 was discouraged by the size of the challenge:
“it’s incredibly challenging, […] you have to act on so many levels […] It can be quite
discouraging.” The complexity of mitigation globally led to some informants feeling apathetic:
we are sitting here and would like to save some two million tons of CO2 in Norway, and
then you know that the Chinese are opening a new coal-fired power plant at least once a
week or two a week. Then it becomes like, the problem isn’t here really, so for me it
becomes a bit like that what's the point? But then that’s kind of ostrich-like. Like, you’re
just moving blindfolded, eyes shut into the future, and off a cliff.
(Informant 0026).
Even those expressing a wish that they took more action found the challenge too big for them
to handle as an individual person:
It’s really sad, the climate is one of those things where you wish you could do more, but
you're just one person it's limited how much one can do. And I wish governments could
make more decisions for us. Because it’s so important, and every day that passes is a
waste.
(Informant 0027).
Informant 0027 further doubted that government or any of the political parties in Norway
could tackle the problem, adding to their despair and inaction:
I don’t think any of the [Norwegian political] parties make good choices. […] None of
them, none of them are good at the environment. So I don't think the government will do
anything until people care. And I don't think people have the capacity to care. And it's
such a scary problem that you almost just want to forget about it.
There was a sense of belief that individual actions do not matter in the bigger scheme unless a
critical mass follows suit.
4.1.3 Knowledge by itself is insufficient to catalyze change
A third result suggests that knowledge by itself is insufficient to overcome mitigation inaction.
In some areas there is too much information for households to make meaningful decisions.
Several interviewees reported confusion regarding what actions were good choices, and that
information can be conflicting and vary over time:
[…] authorities say you should use this mode of transportation or that type of fuel. […] it
shifts from one government to the next. It certainly isn’t easy for us normal guys to
know what’s the right choice. Just look at diesel versus gasoline. Now we all know that
we should drive EVs, by all means, but it isn’t easy.
(Informant 0024).
This makes it difficult to keep track of good alternatives and reduces trust in the information
presented to households. We also found varying degrees of problem denial – in this case
access to information is not the issue, but whether the information is accepted or denied. Most
interviewees accepted that climate change was a serious problem affecting us all, but many
shifted the blame to other countries or other people consuming more than themselves: “Why
should we be so good, look at the Americans” (Informant 0029). Only informant 0037
questioned whether climate change is real or just a hoax:
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No, I said that last time too, I don't believe there’s any global warming. I think it's just
the money, cash money, that's what it's about […]. I still think the main reason for
climate quotas and such have been made so people can earn money.
Some interviewees expressed other forms of climate denial, including questioning the gravity
of the problem:
[…] I’m a bit divided over whether [climate change] is dangerous or not. Because, we
see climate changes happening, it’s always changed. […] But I don’t know enough to
see the big dangers of it.
(Informant 0032).
Our data also suggested habits can trump new information even when it is relevant and not
confusing since falling back into “old sins” was easy:
[…] it’s a wake-up call. The whale with all those plastic bags inside. And then I also think
about these […] fish withmicro plastic things in them. And how clean is our food really. Like
the farmed salmon, how full it is of crap andmisery. So no, you get a wake-up call sometimes
in themedia and stuff like that. Themedia has an incredibly strong influence onwhatwe think
the next few days, the weeks. But, then it’s easy to fall back into old sins. We want to do the
best, and I think we want to do the best for our kids and they grow up to have good values
around these things. But in a busy everyday life it’s not always that easy.
(Informant 0024).
A busy life means it is easy to continue with bad habits, despite “knowing better.” Habits and
routine can trump the ability for information or education to make much of a difference, in the
absence of stronger incentives. Informant 0023 listed many things they could do to reduce their
footprint, but in the end explained their inaction not as a case of lacking options for mitigation
actions, but rather as a case of being “lazy” about it:
Switching to a heat pump was something that I thought was easy to do, but it's an investment
so we haven't done that yet. And I don't know if we're going to do either, but it's certainly
possible then. Recycle 30%more of your waste. We haven't done anything about that either,
but again we have the opportunity to compost. We really should […] I suppose it’s probably
laziness. […] That's it, it simply hasn't been high on the list of priorities.
Several informants said habits can prevent change, despite knowing more low-carbon options
exist:
I mentioned the example of one of our boys wanting meat-free days. […] We pretty
much agree on that. But yes, when you’re a family of five it's like being a small business
where things are run on habit. It’s like yes, yes we must have some meatballs then so
everyone feels full, and yes, yes we have the drive to training.
(Informant 0029).
4.1.4 Transformational levers do exist to overcome barriers and impediments
Finally, and positively, several factors can motivate change, including influencing agents and
networks, inspirational examples, emotions, and convenience. Many households mentioned
being shaped by influencing agents and networks. Friends were important influencing agents
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for many interviewees: “it is clear that my friends have had a real influence [on me].”
(Informant 0023). Others mentioned inspirational examples, in the sense of both negative
events such as conflict and adversity, in addition to support found in collective action can
motivate change:
Conflict, adversity [inspires change]. I think inspiration, it doesn’t have to be conflict it
can also be something that inspires you to make a change for the better. […] At a micro
level, if something gets harder, then it can inspire you to make a change. If something is
difficult in your life, it can inspire you to make a change. If you get fired from work then
it can inspire you to take an education and do something else. […] Doing things together
can inspire people to make a change. When I made a shopping stop, I did it with a friend.
We talked about it, then we both did it and it was a support. And I think it would’ve been
more difficult without anyone to discuss it with. When I stopped eating meat, I stopped
together with my then roommate. So I think support is important.
(Informant 0027).
Others said seeing examples of how to live environmentally friendly can motivate some
behavioral changes:
Friends have influence. And TV, media, news and such […] I have friends that are
environmentally conscious, for example. […] You look at the way they live and think
that you can do some of the same yourself.
(Informant 0034).
Furthermore, emotions can be a lever at promoting change, in that it can feel good to do low-
carbon things, set examples, or inspire:
We see when we have taken the train, we think it’s fun and nice to do as a family and we
enjoy travelling together, and it is easy to make some choices like that, ok we didn’t fly
all the way there. And we saved money, and also without flying for leisure we often save
money too. […] we get really happy when we see that the choices we make don’t have
consequences for our quality of life.
(Informant 00022).
Informant 0025 mentioned how “in a positive way, acting for the climate it makes me feel
better. I feel more active with the environment in general, so I feel in a better position. I feel
better about the future.”
Several informants further mentioned avoiding negative emotions like a guilty conscience
or a sense of shame from doing carbon intensive things can motivate change:
Making decisions that are bad for the environment gives me guilty conscience. […] I try
to travel less. We used to go on weekend trips, and I try to do less of that. Because I
know that a weekend trip isn’t very environmentally friendly.
(Informant 0027).
Feeling shame can be quite productive in terms of triggering behavior change:
[…] I think it’s good for us to feel some of that shame. For example, when one feels like
oh no, I’ve deserved this because I’ve worked so hard, then I feel a bit like you haven’t
deserved anything, you have a safe job and a solid income and you have very small
problems in your life. There are many people out there who actually really deserve it. So
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yes, it’s important to feel [some shame].
(Informant 0022).
Adding to this, Informant 0031 pointed out that we generally want to avoid being seen in a
negative light by others: “being a carbon pig or climate laggard isn’t something you want to
associate yourself with.”
Finally, convenience, in terms of availability of positive actions, and inconvenience of
negative actions, was frequently mentioned as important motivation for low-carbon actions:
Generally accommodating [change]? Availability. Thinking of food and transport. Then
availability is important, an important factor. In some other areas I’d say cost. Like
getting people to [avoid something], then cost will be an important factor.
(Informant 0025).
The economic inconvenience of for example paying rush-time fees and parking fees can also
motivate more low-carbon means of transportation:
I either take the fun [light-rail train] which is over-crowded and has far too little space.
Or I wait until after 9am. Or before 3pm. But right, it costs to park in the city and you’re
a bit stingy with money spent on that. Then the better choice becomes taking public
transportation.
(Informant 0024).
4.2 Policies for accelerating lifestyle decarbonization
Drawing from the directed analysis of our dataset, Table 1 summarizes the interviewees’
perceptions of barriers to and motivators for change related to specific consumption areas,
accompanied by interviewees’ reflections on which changes in policy might facilitate low-
carbon practices in those areas of consumption.
A general result in terms of barriers to low-carbon actions was how cheap and convenient it
was to choose the “bad” alternatives. Choosing the “good” alternatives was perceived as too
costly and often impossible in practice due to poor availability/infrastructure. Motivational
levers included making the low-carbon options comparatively cheaper to the “bad” alternatives
and securing availability of good alternatives. Reflections on policies for addressing the
barriers and taking advantage of the motivational levers pointed to the need for a combination
of measures that reduce the availability of bad options, introduce economic sanctions on GHG-
intensive activities, at the same time as making it economically beneficial to adopt low-carbon
actions. The need for significant investments in infrastructure and availability of low-carbon
options were also stressed, since in many cases it simply became too difficult finding a low-
carbon alternative. In several consumption areas, there was also a need for combining strong
incentivizing measures with targeted information campaigns that explain the environmental
and climate impact of different goods, services, and actions.
5 Discussion and conclusion
Households will undoubtedly shape future emissions pathways (and futures) in complex yet
meaningful ways. The prospect of achieving drastic reductions in carbon footprints, however,
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remains uncertain and depends on choices made in the areas of mobility, food, energy use, and
the location of residence. During the HOPE simulation game, households were asked to
choose up to 65 different mitigation actions across the dimensions of food and recycling,
housing, mobility, and other consumption. The voluntary round of the simulation game
typically led to a 25% reduction of the households’ carbon footprint, and further emission
reductions mostly took place in the “forced” round of simulation 2 (Sköld et al. 2018). The
chosen actions in the voluntary round were characterized by incremental efficiency improve-
ments such as eco-driving or substituting local public transport with walking and cycling
instead of more substantial changes like reducing the number of intercontinental flights or
giving up private cars. For food, the most popular actions were to buy goods with less
packaging, rather than to become a vegetarian. A negative relationship was observed between
the CO2e reduction potential associated with each action and participants’ willingness to
implement said action (Sköld et al. 2018).
Our analysis of the in-depth interviews with households in Bergen having participated
in the HOPE simulation game suggests the barriers for lifestyle decarbonization outweigh
motivational factors. Relying on voluntary actions in the absence of stronger policy
incentives is insufficient as a strategy for realizing the GHG mitigation potential of dealing
with levels of consumption in high-income countries. We identified time and effort
constraints, economic costs, unavailability of good alternatives, habits, and negative
emotions (apathy and hopelessness) as well as societal norms to be the main perceived
barriers for households to implement radical changes to their lifestyles voluntarily. Ac-
cording to the results, decarbonizing lifestyles will likely require strong incentives, and in
some cases restrictions, to mitigate the bulk of consumption-related GHG emissions. This
difficulty of changing lifestyles voluntarily is confirmed in the literature. Schanes et al.
(2016: 1036) note because “consumption is a major component of shared societal and
cultural norms and can contribute to a sense of belonging barriers to consuming less
include the difficulty of establishing everyday routines and habits and concerns with
equality and fairness.” In the environmental social psychology literature, norms are often
found to have very strong influence on decisions (Dietz and Whitley 2018; Farrow et al.
2017; Steg 2016). This fits well with our results in the sense that households reported
difficulties in finding time and energy to establish new climate-friendly routines. Wynes
and Nicholas (2017: 6) also confirmed this point in their study, noting “even knowledge-
able and willing individuals may not reduce meat intake or adopt other high impact actions
if cultural norms or structural barriers act as obstacles.”
Negative emotions, such as apathy and hopelessness, were also barriers for more sustain-
able lifestyle changes. One explanation for these emotions might be a low level of self-efficacy
(Bandura 1977), meaning people do not believe that they or on a group level (group-efficacy)
are able to carry out a climate-friendly action or that it will have the intended impact. For
sustainable lifestyle choices, self-efficacy has been identified to be an important predictor
(Niles et al. 2016; White et al. 2011). Moreover, our results seem to support the notion in social
psychology that apathy over and inaction on climate change is not always a consequence of
information or comprehension deficits, but it could rather be explained by a conflict between
personal interests formed by group identities and acting on knowledge for collective welfare
that may contradict these interests (Kahan et al. 2012). Information by itself is then insufficient
to overcome mitigation inaction, especially since people are very good at selective engagement
with information suiting their personal interests and ignoring the rest (Golman et al. 2016).
This reaction is also known as the “ostrich effect.” Overwhelmed by negative information,
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people can feel paralyzed and start ignoring certain information (Haltinner and Sarathchandra
2018). This observation goes in line with the notion of cognitive dissonance where individuals
may rationalize, underplay, or distort information to suit their personal interests and reduce the
psychological discomfort resulting from holding contradictory beliefs or desires (e.g., choos-
ing climate action vs. comfort or pleasure) (Schrems and Upham 2020). While learning about
the seriousness of climate change and the mitigation potential of household actions may be
insufficient to change decisions, a lack of knowledge can also (paradoxically) lead to ineffec-
tive actions (Attari et al. 2010).
Carbon-intensive modes of transportation such as air travel might be an interesting example
of that: our informants accepted it is one of the biggest single contributors to their carbon
footprint but reductions in this area were very challenging. Perhaps the dominant technology
optimism in society at large and inherent in our climate policies could help explain why, since
policies for substantial volume reductions are lacking (Moberg et al. 2019). Informant 0026
expressed a disbelief in environmentally friendly technology fixes for planes and cars.
“Myths” about technology fixes, as in the case of air travel where promises of “climate
friendly” electric planes, could have a stalling effect on climate policy development (Peeters
et al. 2016). An important part of the climate policy solution, as indicated by our informants
expressing the need for this in different contexts, is an increased focus on volume reduction in
private consumption. Somewhat perversely, the greater the reduction potential of mitigation
actions, the fewer households were willing to implement them (Sköld et al. 2018). Actions
with greater mitigation potential reflect greater lifestyle changes and challenges for adoption. It
is perhaps then not surprising a recent survey found that participants responded negatively to
statements that individuals should take mitigation actions, finding it more palatable that other
actors such as industry and businesses should be the ones taking action (Palm et al. 2020).
Our results point to several motivational levers that could lead to potentially transforma-
tional lifestyle changes. These include easing access to low-carbon actions, and decreasing
access to carbon-intensive actions, influencing agents and networks of support, the power of
following inspirational examples, feeling good about helping the environment or contributing
to a more sustainable future, and negative emotions such as shame and guilt as behavioral
regulators. While experiencing such negative adaptive emotions could lead to no change if the
process of implementing the change becomes too complicated, such emotions have at the same
time been found to be potent motivators for initiating reflection on a need for changing
behavior (Lickel et al. 2014), an important first step of transformational change. Emotional
levers can be grounded in intrinsic motivation (for the sake of the climate/environment), or
extrinsic motivation (to receive a higher social/moral status, or to be similar to friends/peers).
These findings are supported by the literature, where psycho-social factors, such as the
willingness to sacrifice, have been identified to be the most important drivers for climate-
friendly behavior (Thaller et al. 2020).
Our research, moreover, points the way towards emerging gaps and future research needs.
For example, our analysis has been based on in-depth interviews with a sample of households
in Bergen, Norway. Are our results compatible with larger sample sizes in Norway, Europe, or
other parts of the world? Is it consistent with quantitative work looking at stated preferences,
choice experiments, or pro-environmental values through large-scale surveys? Does our
qualitative work suggest hypotheses for surveys usually grounded in social psychology? Other
questions not answered in this paper are if and how people relate to trade-offs: do they weigh
up reductions in one area against reductions in other areas? What factors influence which
mitigation actions people prioritize? These are questions for future research to address.
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Household decision-making and behavioral change is neither the silver bullet of climate
policies, nor purely a consequence of climate policies. Households demand goods and services
that propel economic development and consequently drive emissions, yet they also reflect
broader patterns of infrastructures, technologies, organizations, markets, and practices that
could be harnessed for near-term GHG emission reduction (Wilson et al. 2019). There is a
duality, temporality, and reversibility to their potential to become either active agents of
decarbonization or aggressive culprits accelerating emissions. The results of this paper
suggest that overcoming barriers for lifestyle decarbonization requires stronger govern-
ment action targeting demand-side mitigation by increasing accessibility of low-carbon
alternatives for diets, mobility, and household energy use, in addition to policies render-
ing carbon-intensive actions less accessible. While there are significant challenges to
households and individuals taking stronger mitigation action, these challenges can be
overcome by strengthening government policies targeting the patterns and volumes of
private consumption.
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